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COMMENTS ON KAMISAR
DANIEL D. POLSBY*
Each of us is going hence from this world, and if for no
other reason than that it behooves us to think about how our
departure might be made less terrible. Professor Kamisar, as a
twenty-seven-year-old prodigy in legal studies many years ago,
argued that it is illusory to think of the institution of mercykilling as a way out. I am going to focus my remarks on a narrow point because on the broader question-whether this is a
slope too slippery for the law venture upon-it seems to me that
Professor Kamisar has utterly routed the opposing arguments.
Still, he concedes, as everyone must, that the problem of suffering at the end of life makes demands on the human conscience,
and upon public policy, that will not go away-even though the
right argument may already have been propounded. It may be
that what makes this problem so durable for us is that much of
what makes a given case heartwrenching is that it dwells in a
world of background legal assumptions and institutions which
no longer portray or represent us as we believe we are or would
like to be.
In his article forty years ago, Professor Kamisar wrote: "The
whole field of severe pain and its management in the terminal
stage of cancer is, according to an eminent physician, 'a subject
neglected far too much by the medical profession."" Before the
subject of euthanasia becomes apropos, his point was, one must
fully exploit less exorbitant means of speaking to the problem of
human affliction.
The very same point is still being made today by people interested in the twin questions of euthanasia and assisted suicide,
including, ironically, by physicians with special competence and
expertise in the management of terminal pain. We do not train
residents well enough in palliation, it is said; drug companies do
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not devote adequate funds to research; this is not a priority for
the Food and Drug Administration-and so on. If only we
could furnish adequate comfort to dying patients, we should be
much less likely to think ourselves justified in killing them to
save the wrenching of our fastidious hearts; and they should be
much less likely to demand that we help them kill themselves.
Well and truly, the pith of this moral problem is a problem of
technology. Give us the right analgesics and the set of one
thousand compelling cases will become a set of one hundred or
of fifty. So where are these palliative drugs for which we have
been waiting these last forty years? And where are the doctors
and healers who can show us how to use them if, God forbid, we
need to be shown?
Well, we do know where some of them are. We have known
that diacetyl-morphine is a superior pain-management tool for
some patients and some conditions, used as such for many years
in various parts of the world-but not in America where, under
the street name heroin, possession of diacetyl-morphine will get
a doctor more legal grief than he would get if he were caught
bumping off his patient.
There may be demand for better and stronger pain-killing
pharmaceuticals out there, but since when can we expect highly
regulated oligopolies like drug companies to respond to market
demand? There may be a demand for more hospice care and
the like, but when we abandoned fee-for-service medicine in favor of dealing with the customer satisfaction clerk at our
friendly, neighborhood HMO, we severed the link between
"customer" and "satisfaction" effectively and forever. Because
we regard it as somehow an anomaly, as something twisted and
grotesque, a declasse libertarian pipe-dream, that a person
should be able simply to go out and buy a pain reliever when he
is in pain, it is routine and automatic to problematize behavior
by a very ill person that carries a very high risk of mortality. By
socializing the risk to some extent, we have taken it upon ourselves. And so the question is framed: "When may 'we' allow
this" or "when may 'we' compel that," recognizing that, because
we have seen fit to burden the medical aspect of life with legalism and regulation and illimitable, fatuous New Deal paternalism, we must be taken to have adopted the decision that Jane
Doe and Richard Roe might make for themselves. So it becomes "our" decision, the thing that "we" do, when someone else is
dying in pain. Thus is born a problem of public policy, some-
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thing that bar association committees have to be appointed to
look into, something that chairs in ethics have to be endowed to
keep in view, that distinguished lectures have to be commissioned to address, that we have to discuss and plan for in order
to make- certain that our regulations and regulators are state-ofthe-art.
I suggest, though, that it is a chimera to think that a highly
regulated world will ever be satisfactory or nearly so. At some
point, it seems to me, we have to learn something from experience. Forty years ago, the technological problem was the same
as it is today: there is too much pain out there, and while no one
actually likes pain, no one has much of an incentive to do that
much about it. There is, I believe, a way out of the box: Change
the incentives. By legalizing markets in pain relief-markets
that are currently highly illegal-one should expect more palliation of morbid pain than one sees currently. Indeed, one
should expect to see much more, because these markets are not
only regulated but harshly and pervasively regulated, and their
outputs must be highly restricted compared with what one
would see if regulation were moderated or withdrawn. More
palliation means fewer compelling, heartwrenching cases, in all
likelihood many fewer. And we should look forward to living,
and dying, as free men and women instead of the cringing,
housebroken patsies of the administrative welfare state.

